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Feature ReviewNot all memories are equally welcome in awareness.
People limit the time they spend thinking about unpleas-
ant experiences, a process that begins during encoding,
but that continues when cues later remind someone of
the memory. Here, we review the emerging behavioural
and neuroimaging evidence that suppressing awareness
of an unwelcome memory, at encoding or retrieval, is
achieved by inhibitory control processes mediated by
the lateral prefrontal cortex. These mechanisms interact
with neural structures that represent experiences in
memory, disrupting traces that support retention. Thus,
mechanisms engaged to regulate momentary aware-
ness introduce lasting biases in which experiences re-
main accessible. We argue that theories of forgetting
that neglect the motivated control of awareness omit a
powerful force shaping the retention of our past.
A neglected force that shapes retention
Over the past century, memory research has focused on
passive factors that make us forget. Forgetting has been
proposed to result from the decay of memories over time,
the accumulation of similar interfering experiences in
memory, and changes in physical context that make it
harder to recall the past [1]. This historical emphasis on
passive factors fits the common assumption that forgetting
is a negative outcome and, thus, any process underlying it
must happen involuntarily. Although forgetting is often
negative, this emphasis neglects a fundamental feature of
human existence: not all experiences are pleasant. When
reminded of negative events, we are not well disposed
towards them and we deliberately limit their tenure in
awareness. This process is familiar to most people; a
reminder evokes a brief flash of memory and feeling,
abruptly followed by efforts to exclude the unwanted mem-
ory from awareness. We do this to preserve our emotional
state, to protect our sense of self, and sometimes simply to
concentrate on what needs to be done. Therefore, any
scientific theory of forgetting must include an account of
the considerable motivational forces that shape retention.
Here, we review the growing research on neural mech-
anisms underlying motivated forgetting. The term1364-6613/
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arising from active processes that down-prioritise un-
wanted experiences in service of creating or sustaining
an emotional or cognitive state. For example, to sustain
positive emotions or concentration, belief in some state of
affairs, confidence, or optimism, it may be necessary to
reduce accessibility of experiences that undermine those
states. Here, we focus on neural evidence for the role of
inhibitory control processes in the voluntary interruption
of mnemonic processing. A core claim is that these inhibi-
tory control processes, widely studied in psychology
and cognitive neuroscience, can be targeted flexibly at
different stages of mnemonic processing and at different
types of representation to modulate the state of traces in
memory.
In support of this view, we review evidence that inhibi-
tion can be engaged either during memory encoding or
retrieval to limit retention of unwanted memories. Stop-
ping encoding may disrupt the consolidation of traces
already formed, and also prevent further reflection on
the experience that would enhance its longevity. By con-
trast, stopping retrieval disrupts the automatic progres-
sion from cues to an associated memory, the persisting
effects of which influence whether the experience remains
accessible. Both encoding and retrieval stopping terminate
an unfolding mnemonic process so that an experience can
be excluded from conscious awareness. Through these
efforts to terminate awareness, attentional control inter-
acts with traces in episodic memory to shape what we do
and do not remember of our past.
Inhibitory control at encoding
An effective way of keeping an unwanted memory from
being retrieved in the future is to disrupt and truncate its
encoding. These processes are investigated with directed
forgetting paradigms, in which participants receive a cue
to forget information that they just acquired [2]. Hundreds
of studies conducted over the past 50 years reveal that
humans can readily implement such forgetting instruc-
tions, demonstrating that motivation indeed shapes encod-
ing. Inhibition has been proposed to have a role in stopping
encoding processes in these procedures, although passive
factors also are likely to have a role (e.g., [3]). We focus here
on evidence indicating a distinct contribution of inhibitory
control in actively limiting the encoding of unwanted
experience. This evidence has been collected with theTrends in Cognitive Sciences, June 2014, Vol. 18, No. 6 279
Glossary
Accessibility versus availability: : a theoretical distinction on why memory
retrieval can fail. We may fail to retrieve memories because we do not access a
stored memory (i.e., accessibility) or because the memory is not available
anymore in the system (i.e., availability).
Brain oscillations: : regular fluctuations visible in the EEG and/or magnetoen-
cephalogram (MEG), most likely reflecting summated excitatory and inhibitory
postsynaptic potentials. Brain oscillations occur at different distinct frequen-
cies (up to 150 Hz) and have an important role in synchronising neural
assemblies [104] and shaping synaptic plasticity [35].
Cue independence: : the tendency for suppression-induced forgetting to
generalise to novel test cues other than the one originally used as a cue during
retrieval suppression.
Direct suppression: : a method of limiting awareness of an unwanted memory
when a reminder appears in which a person disengages the retrieval process to
either prevent the memory for coming to mind, or to limit its time in
awareness. Inhibition is thought to be a key process in overriding the natural
operation of the retrieval mechanism.
Effective connectivity analysis: : a form of connectivity analysis that allows one
to infer not only that neural activity in two distinct regions is related (statistically),
but also the directional nature of that relation. Effective connectivity analyses,
such as dynamic causal modelling, permit causal inferences about the influence
of one brain region on another in conditions of interest.
Episodic context: : the spatiotemporal environment in which a stimulus is
encountered. The representation of this context and its association to a stimulus
form a fundamental feature of episodic memory of the stimulus. Context can also
refer to internal states that get associated to a stimulus (e.g., mood or incidental
thoughts), which is sometimes referred to as ‘mental context’.
Event-related potential (ERP): : a time-varying brain signal with positive and
negative deflections (so-called ‘components’), obtained by averaging over
several EEG segments corresponding to a task or stimulus.
Fading affect bias: : the documented tendency for negative emotions
associated with personal experiences to decline more quickly over time
compared with positive emotions.
Inhibitory control: : a control process that downregulates activity of interfering
or otherwise unwanted representations in the service of a current task or goal,
reducing their influence on cognition and behaviour.
Late positive component (LPC): : a positive ERP component related to episodic
retrieval. During a retrieval task, the LPC emerges approximately 400–800 ms
after stimulus onset, is maximal over parietal recording sites, and is assumed
to reflect retrieval of contextual details of the study episode (i.e., recollection
[105]).
Long-range synchrony: : synchronisation between distant cell populations
separated by several centimetres (e.g., frontal and parietal). Long-range
synchrony is usually estimated based on the co-variation of oscillatory phase
between two recording cites.
Mnemic neglect: : the tendency for people to have a higher rate of forgetting
for negative feedback about themselves and their performance, than for
neutral or positive feedback, even when encoding time is matched.
N2: : a negative ERP component related to cognitive control, and often
associated with motor response inhibition. The N2 refers to enhanced
frontocentral negativity typically approximately 150–400 ms.
Repetition priming: : improved performance in processing a stimulus arising
from prior exposure to the stimulus.
Repetition suppression: : the finding that repetitions of a stimulus elicit less
neural activity in areas involved in processing the stimulus, compared with
nonrepeated stimuli, taken to be a marker of memory for the stimulus.
Repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS): : a technique commonly
used to stimulate a specific brain area by applying a time-varying magnetic
field that induces electric current flow in the brain.
Selective rehearsal: : a passive, noninhibitory account used to explain the
reduced memory performance for to-be-forgotten items, relative to to-be-
remembered items.
Socially shared retrieval-induced forgetting: : when a person is recounting an
experience shared by listeners, the tendency for the listeners to later forget (at
a higher rate) details not recounted by the speaker. The higher rate of
forgetting is thought to arise from listeners covertly retrieving the experience
as it is being recounted and, consequently, inducing retrieval-induced
forgetting on nonretrieved knowledge.
Suppression-induced forgetting: : in the TNT procedure, impaired recall of no-
think items, compared with baseline memories that are neither retrieved nor
suppressed.
Think/no-think procedure (TNT): : the main procedure used to study retrieval
suppression, whereby people are repeatedly prompted with cues to memories
and asked to either retrieve (think) the memory, or to stop its retrieval (no-
think), with the result that suppressed items are more poorly recalled on later
tests.
Thought substitution: : a method of preventing retrieval of an unwanted
memory when a reminder appears in which a person generates alternative
thoughts associated to the reminder to occupy awareness.
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280item-method [4] and list-method [5] directed forgetting
procedures (Box 1).
Item-method directed forgetting
Item-method directed forgetting has a long tradition in
cognitive psychology [4]. This effect is robust, as reflected
by the range of conditions under which it has been
reported, including both explicit and implicit memory tests
[6,7]. Item-method directed forgetting usually has been
explained in terms of selective rehearsal (see Glossary)
according to which to-be-forgotten items are spared from
further processing and are subject to passive forgetting,
whereas to-be-remembered items are actively rehearsed
[2]. Interestingly, the occurrence of item-method directed
forgetting in recognition tests has been used as an argu-
ment for passive, noninhibitory explanations, because
some have argued that inhibition should only temporarily
reduce the accessibility of the affected items and, therefore,
it should be possible to release these items from inhibition
later [2].
Although selective rehearsal is a common interpreta-
tion of item-method directed forgetting [2], recent beha-
vioural and neural evidence indicates that inhibitory
control over episodic encoding may have a bigger role than
has been acknowledged. For example, the selective re-
hearsal account emphasises processes acting on to-be-re-
membered items, which are rehearsed more extensively
and elaborately when the cue to remember is given. There-
fore, the system should experience more cognitive load in
the remember compared to the ‘forget’ condition, in which
people can simply drop the to-be-forgotten item from work-
ing memory. This prediction was tested in several experi-
ments in which participants performed a secondary task
after the remember and/or forget cue was given [8,9].
However, contrary to the selective rehearsal account, the
forget condition was more effortful than the remember
condition, as reflected by slower reaction times to perform
the secondary task during execution of the forget instruc-
tion. Moreover, stopping a motor response after the cue is
more successful in the forget compared with the remember
condition [9], suggesting that forget cues trigger similar
inhibitory mechanisms to those engaged when stopping a
motor action [10]. However, further clarification of this
possibility is needed [9]. These results clearly imply that an
active process contributes to item-method directed for-
getting [11], and raise the possibility that it is inhibitory
in nature. This possibility is consistent with evidence that
directed forgetting cues lead to the removal of items from
working memory and not merely to passive decay [12,13].
Several recent functional (f)MRI studies support the
hypothesis that item-method directed forgetting engages
an active process that inhibits ongoing encoding [14–18].
These studies consistently indicate that attempting to
forget a recent item engages prefrontal and parietal
regions, suggesting that forgetting is effortful, consistent
with behavioural findings [15,16,18]. The right superior
and middle frontal gyrus (approximately BA 9/10), and the
right inferior parietal lobe (approximately BA 40) are
consistently more active during intentional forgetting
(to-be-forgotten items that are actually forgotten) com-
pared with incidental forgetting (to-be-remembered items
Box 1. Item and list-method directed forgetting
In studies of directed forgetting, two procedures are generally used: the
item-method and the list-method (see [1]). These paradigms are
illustrated in Figure I. As illustrated in Figure IA, in item-method directed
forgetting, participants study items one at a time, and each item is
followed by a forget (F) or remember (R) instruction. Later, memory for
all items is tested. As shown in Figure IB, in list-method directed
forgetting, a entire list of items is first studied, followed by a F or R
instruction. A second list is then studied, usually followed by a R
instruction. At the end, a recall test occurs. Figure IC compares the typical
behavioural results obtained in item-method (Figure ICi) and list-method
(Figure ICii) directed forgetting. Figure ICii shows the twofold effect of
the forget cue on the recall test, with forgetting of list-1 items and
enhancement of list-2 items. In both paradigms, participants do not
know in advance whether they should forget or remember the respective
item. Thus, the control processes mediating these effects must act on
memory representations and not the initial perception of an event.
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Figure I. The item and list-methods for studying directed forgetting, along with the typical pattern of findings (for real examples, see [8] and [5,25], respectively).
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findings suggest that intentional forgetting recruits addi-
tional processes beyond those associated with incidental
forgetting, these activations do not specify the nature of
those processes. For example, activations during forget
trials might reflect engagement of the default mode net-
work, which is characterised by positive blood oxygenation
level-dependent (BOLD) correlations between superior
prefrontal and parietal cortex during rest [19]. Thus, these(A) (B)
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Figure 1. Neural correlates of directed forgetting (DF). (A) An activation map of a recen
significant voxels (P <0.005) indicating greater activity for to-be-forgotten items that are
(B,C) The results of a multimodal list-method DF experiment [32]. (B) Forget instructions
in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and reduced alpha/beta long-range syn
Stimulating the DLPFC with repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS; 1 Hz) se
with permission, from [32] (B,C). Abbreviation: EEG, electroencephalogram.findings may simply reflect a greater incidence of passive
rest during forget trials compared with remember trials.
However, speaking against this view, connectivity analy-
ses show that activity in the right dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (DLPFC) during forget trials predicts decreased
activity in the left hippocampus, especially during success-
ful intentional forgetting [18]. This latter result is incom-
patible with the default mode network hypothesis, which
predicts the opposite (positive) connectivity patternEEG rTMS
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t item-method directed forgetting functional (f)MRI study [18]. Red areas illustrate
 actually forgotten compared with to-be-remembered items that are remembered.
 were associated with increased blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) signal
chrony [11–18 Hz (i)], which were negatively correlated on a single trial level (ii). (C)
lectively increased list-1 forgetting, without affecting list-2 enhancement. Adapted,
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Rather, negative connectivity between right DLPFC and
hippocampus suggests that the right prefrontal cortex
exerts inhibitory control over the encoding activity in
the MTL [21], similar to that observed during retrieval
(see ‘Neural Basis of Retrieval Suppression’). One plausi-
ble hypothesis is that the active forgetting mechanism
implicated by behavioural studies [15,16,18] may reflect
the action of this frontohippocampal modulatory system.
The neural correlates of item-method directed forgetting
have also been studied with intracranial event-related
potentials, providing information about the temporal dy-
namics of the forgetting mechanism within the MTL [22].
This study found that forget cues that cause later forgetting
elicited decreased negativity in the anterior hippocampus
compared with remember cues that led to forgetting. Nota-
bly, enhanced negativity in the hippocampus at approxi-
mately 500 ms is usually related to successful encoding.
These authors further found that forget cues triggered
sustained positivity in the rhinal cortex, an interfacing
structure between the cortex and hippocampus. Together
with scalp event-related potential (ERP) studies, showing
sustained prefrontal positivity after the forget cue [23],
localised to the right DLPFC [24], these studies converge
with fMRI data to suggest that item-method directed for-
getting recruits a right prefrontal–MTL network to termi-
nate episodic encoding processes. Together, these studies
question a purely passive based view of item-method direct-
ed forgetting, which has been the popular account among
experimental psychologists.
List-method directed forgetting
Sometimes, we may wish to forget a set of events that is
extended in time (e.g., a recent doctor’s visit, or dispute with
an unpleasant acquaintance). This situation is modelled by
the list-method of directed forgetting (Box 1). A typical exper-
iment comprises two lists (e.g., 10–20 items in each list), with
a forget or remember cue given after the first list [2,25]. After
encoding the second list, a brief distracting task follows and
then recall is tested. On this final test, people typically recall
the first list more poorly when it is followed by a forget,
compared with a remember, instruction. Interestingly, people
recall the items following a forget cue better than they do
items studied after a remember cue (Box1, Figure 1C) (e.g.,
[25]). These complementary effects are referred to as list-1
forgetting and list-2 enhancement. These effects arise on free
recall, cued recall, and recognition tests, although, in the
latter case, deficits are often restricted to source memory.
List-method directed forgetting effects have also been ob-
served in autobiographical memory [26,27]. Poorer recall of
the to-be-forgotten list is believed to reflect reduced accessi-
bility rather than reduced availability of the forgotten mate-
rial [2,28,29]. Both active [5,30] and passive mechanisms have
also been proposed for this phenomenon [3,31].
As with item-method directed forgetting, imaging re-
search with the list method indicates that instructions to
forget trigger an active process that disrupts mnemonic
activity. For example, two studies examined the neurophys-
iological mechanisms of directed forgetting by focussing on
brain oscillations [30,32]. Prior work established that mem-
ory formation is typically accompanied by increased large282scale synchrony, a neural marker thought to reflect upregu-
lated synaptic plasticity [33–35]. Strikingly, cuing people to
forget a just-studied list decreased the large-scale synchrony
in a widespread cortical network in the alpha/beta frequency
range. Individual differences in this effect predicted for-
getting of to-be-forgotten items [30], suggesting that decreas-
ing synchrony disrupts neural processes that would improve
retention. This finding was replicated in a multimodal
electroencephalography (EEG)–fMRI study [32], in which
it was found to be associated with increased BOLD signal in
the left DLPFC (Figure 1B). Following this discovery, a
combined EEG–repetitive transcranial magnetic stimula-
tion (rTMS) experiment demonstrated that stimulating
the left DLPFC with rTMS during a forget instruction also
reduced neural synchrony, significantly increasing directed
forgetting (Figure 1C). Enhanced forgetting following rTMS
indicates that stimulation facilitated processes needed to
implement directed forgetting, consistent with findings
showing that rTMS can enhance, rather than disrupt pro-
cessing (see [32] for a detailed discussion of the enhancing
effects of slow rTMS on forgetting). This finding supports a
causal role of frontally driven processes in inducing for-
getting effects and complements work showing that prefron-
tal lesions disrupt list-method directed forgetting [36].
Increased activation of the DLPFC together with de-
creased neural synchrony suggests that an active control
process contributes to directed forgetting. However, these
findings do not specify that this active process necessarily
engages inhibitory control. For example, prior studies have
highlighted the importance of the DLPFC in task switching
(reviewed in [37]). Therefore, DLPFC involvement during
the forget instruction might simply reflect a voluntarily
induced task switch that stops rehearsal, and not inhibition.
However, this overlap between directed forgetting and task-
switching activations may be driven by inhibitory processes
involved during task switching, as numerous studies indi-
cate [38]. Furthermore, in EEG studies, task switching
typically induces a pronounced increase in frontoparietal
theta long-range synchrony [39], in stark contrast to the
decreases in alpha/beta long-range synchrony observed in
list-method directed forgetting. Although these findings
suggest that directed forgetting activations are unlikely
to arise from task switching, the relations between the
processes in the two tasks merits further exploration.
The improved recall of list-2 that accompanies the for-
getting of list-1 items might suggest a single mechanism
that enhances list-2 encoding by reducing interference
from list-1 items [2]. However, there are reasons to doubt
this. First, forgetting and enhancement are often uncorre-
lated (e.g., [30,40,41]). Second, list-1 forgetting often can be
modulated independently of list-2 enhancement [32,42].
Third, whereas all list-1 items suffer forgetting, irrespec-
tive of their serial position, the enhancement of list-2
appears to be driven by the first few items [42]. The latter
result fits electrophysiological data suggesting that the
forget cue enhances subsequent encoding because it acts
like a ‘reset button’ that frees cognitive resources and
allows a fresh encoding start. This assumption is reflected
in EEG work showing that oscillatory markers of encoding
exhaustion, which gradually increase with the number of
encoded items, are reset by the forget cue [42]. This latter
Box 2. The TNT paradigm
The TNT procedure mimics situations in which we encounter a
reminder to a memory we prefer not to think about, and try to keep
the memory out of mind [53]. To create reminders, participants
study cue–target pairs (e.g., word pairs, or picture pairs, such as
‘ordeal roach’) and are then trained to recall the second item (roach)
of the pair whenever they encounter the first (ordeal) as a reminder.
Participants then participate in the TNT phase, in which they are
asked to exert control over retrieval. On each trial, reminders from
the pairs appear in green or red; when the reminder appears in
green, participants are to recall the response, whereas, for red
reminders, participants are asked to avoid retrieving the response,
preventing it from entering awareness. The key question concerns
whether people can recruit inhibition to prevent the memory from
intruding into consciousness, and whether doing so disrupts later
retention of the unwanted memory.
To measure the effects of retrieval suppression, participants
receive a final test in which they are given each reminder and are
asked to recall the associated response. Memory performance is
compared between items that participants suppressed (no-think
trials), items that they retrieved (think trials), and items that they
studied, but neither suppressed nor retrieved during the TNT phase
(baseline trials). Comparing final recall of no-think items to either
think or baseline items indicates whether retrieval suppression
affects retention. Comparing no-think to baseline items is more
appropriate when trying to establish that suppression makes
memory worse, as opposed to merely preventing memory improve-
ment that might arise from repeated reminders.
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usually decreases during memory encoding [43,44]. Thus,
forgetting and enhancement in list-method directed for-
getting appear to reflect different processes that can be
dissociated on a cognitive and neural level.
The list and item methods differ in the target of for-
getting. Whereas the item method targets individual
items, the list method typically directs people to forget a
set of items defined by temporal context (i.e., ‘the previous
list’). This broader targeting may be implemented by
directing inhibition at representations of temporal context
rather than individual items. Consistent with this, list-
method directed forgetting induces a shift away from the
mental context of the first list, and this context shift may
make it harder to recall list-1 items. For example, a forget
instruction induces forgetting effects similar to those
caused by other instructions designed merely to shift
mental context away from the first list, without instructing
people to forget [3]. Given that similar forgetting can be
induced without instructing people to forget, some have
argued that directed forgetting need not reflect inhibitory
control [3]. However, an alternative possibility is that
directed forgetting instructions achieve context shifts in
a mechanistically distinct way, by engaging inhibitory
control to force a shift in context. Consistent with this
possibility, directed forgetting and ‘mental context shift’
instructions appear to be mediated by different neural
processes. Whereas mental context shift instructions
mainly affect local alpha and theta synchrony [45,46], only
directed forgetting disrupts long-range alpha/beta neural
synchrony [30,32]. Combined with evidence for a causal
role of prefrontal cortex in inducing these changes in both
long-range synchrony and forgetting [32], these findings
suggest that an active inhibitory process disrupts list-1
context in directed forgetting. However, these dissociations
are based on between-study comparisons because no study
has yet directly contrasted EEG synchrony patterns be-
tween directed forgetting and mental context change.
Although inhibition may typically be targeted at tem-
poral context in list-method directed forgetting, other tar-
gets are possible. For example, recent research has
examined whether directed forgetting can be targeted
selectively at some, but not all, of the pre-cue information
[47–51]. Three of these studies demonstrated this is possi-
ble [48–50]. For instance, one study demonstrated selec-
tivity of directed forgetting in three experiments using
visual (colours) and auditory (words spoken by a female
versus male voice) material [49]. In one experiment, list-1
items were spoken either by a male or a female voice,
alternating on an item-by-item basis, and the participants
were able to forget items selectively based on the gender of
the speaker. However, some studies failed to find selective
directed forgetting [47,51]. The reasons for these discre-
pancies are currently unknown. If directed forgetting is
selective, it suggests that the inhibitory processes target
dimensions other than temporal context.
To conclude, behavioural and neurophysiological studies
indicate that encoding can be disrupted or truncated by an
active inhibitory control mechanism that limits the repre-
sentation of an experience in long-term memory. Similar to
inhibitory control in the motor system, where higher-ordercontrol regions in the prefrontal cortex suppress activity in
lower-order motor regions to stop a movement [52], the
prefrontal cortex targets memory-related structures in
the MTL [18,22]. These processes reduce encoding activity
and downregulate long-range neural synchrony [32] to dis-
rupt the formation of unwanted memories.
Inhibitory control at retrieval
Unwanted experiences are often stored in memory, despite
efforts to limit encoding. When this happens, limiting
awareness becomes a problem of controlling retrieval.
Retrieval can of course be prevented by avoiding remin-
ders, which is a common behaviour after an unpleasant
event. However, when unwelcome reminders occur, people
often try to exclude the unwanted memory from aware-
ness. Stopping retrieval of an unwanted memory is known
as ‘retrieval suppression’, a process that engages response
override mechanisms formally similar to stopping a reflex-
ive motor action [53,54]. Retrieval suppression is often
studied with the think/no-think paradigm (TNT) [53],
which mimics situations when we try to suppress unwel-
come remindings (Box 2).
Behavioural effects of retrieval suppression
The TNT procedure consistently shows that people can
limit retrieval [53–55]. Two main findings support this
conclusion. First, suppressing retrieval consistently
abolishes the benefits of reminders on memory, as
reflected in the sizeable difference in final recall between
Think and No-Think items. Thus, at a minimum, suppres-
sing retrieval reduces the facilitation that retrieved mem-
ories usually enjoy. Second, suppressing retrieval often
reduces recall for No-Think items below that observed for
baseline items, a phenomenon known as ‘suppression-
induced forgetting’. Suppression-induced forgetting is283
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retrieval suppression, reminders do not merely fail to
enhance retention, but trigger processes that impair ac-
cess to the unwanted memory. These findings highlight a
central theme of this article: that one’s disposition towards
a memory affects how well it is retained. Reminders
enhance retention when a person is well disposed towards
a memory, but when one has motivations for excluding a
memory from awareness, retrieval can be stopped, pre-
venting the benefits of retrieval and further disrupting the
memory. These symmetrical effects of reminders indicate
a high level of control over the retrieval process, control
that shapes accessibility.
Much is now known about suppression-induced for-
getting. First, forgetting increases with the number of times
a memory is suppressed [53,55–60], indicating that suppres-
sion yields cumulative effects. The forgetting effect can be
further increased if participants are given time to prepare
for suppression [61], indicating the importance of anticipa-
tory processes. Suppression-induced forgetting arises with
many stimuli, including word pairs, face–scene pairs [62–
65], face–word pairs [58], word–object pairs [66,67], and
pairs comprising words and nonsense shapes [68]. Suppres-
sion-induced forgetting has even been observed with auto-
biographical experiences [69–71], although suppression
impairs memory for event details more than access to the
event itself. Some studies have reported a lack of suppres-
sion-induced forgetting when it might otherwise be expected
(see [55] for a detailed discussion with hypotheses). For-
getting effects occur whether the memory is a neutral or
negatively valenced word or scene [59,60,62–65,72–79],
although it remains unclear whether forgetting increases
[60,62], decreases [65,80], or is unaffected [74,75] with
negative, compared with neutral valence. Although few
studies have examined how long forgetting lasts, one study
found that a single suppression session produces forgetting
that lasts at least 24 h [81], with other evidence suggesting
that it may dissipate after a week [70,80]. Suppression-
induced forgetting is diminished in young children [82]
and older adults [56], two populations hypothesised to have
deficient inhibitory control function. Interestingly, individ-
ual differences in participants’ perceptions of their ability to
control unwanted thoughts in daily life predict suppression-
induced forgetting of aversive scenes [77].
Suppression-induced forgetting exhibits properties con-
sistent with a role of inhibitory control. For example, the
forgetting often generalises to novel test cues. For instance,
after studying ordeal–roach, if participants suppress
‘roach’ whenever they receive ‘ordeal’ as a cue, roach will
be recalled more poorly, regardless of whether it is tested
with ‘Ordeal’ or ‘Insect’. Thus, suppressing a memory
reduces its accessibility from a variety of cues, a property
known as ‘cue independence’ [53]. Cue independence indi-
cates that the forgetting most likely reflects disruption of
the suppressed trace itself rather than the particular
pathway from the reminder to the trace (reviewed in
[55]; see also [83]). This is usually taken as strong evidence
for an inhibition process that suppresses the trace ([53],
although see [84] for an alternative]. As additional support
for an item-specific inhibition process, forgetting has also
been found on item recognition tests for both words and284abstract shapes [68,85]. Moreover, the effect even occurs on
indirect priming tests, such as perceptual identification:
participants who suppress retrieval of visual objects are
less likely to identify correctly those objects when they are
presented in visual noise [66,67]. Thus, suppression not
only impairs conscious access to unwanted memories, but
also affects their unconscious influence, at least on tests of
object perception.
Although research on retrieval suppression usually asks
people to recall suppressed items intentionally, this argu-
ably does not reflect real-world circumstances. In most
cases, people are unlikely to try to recall experiences they
were motivated to suppress. A more appropriate measure of
the impact of suppression in real terms would measure the
tendency to retrieve the suppressed content, rather than the
ability to do so [86]. For instance, how likely would people be
to respond with the suppressed content on a free association
test? Interestingly, on such tests, suppression effects are
especially pronounced [86]. This raises the possibility that
intentional recall measures underestimate the change in
spontaneous retrieval patterns that arise in real life.
Changes in retrieval patterns introduced by inhibition
may be sustained over the long term by alternative associa-
tions that naturally arise in response to reminders. Indeed,
asking people to generate alternative associations to a
reminder often increases forgetting, compared with not
giving specific instructions. However, as noted shortly,
thought substitution is not necessary to induce forgetting,
and several mechanisms contribute to suppression-induced
forgetting.
Neural basis of retrieval suppression
Similar to directed forgetting, stopping retrieval appears
to be achieved, in part, by control mechanisms mediated by
the prefrontal cortex. Retrieval suppression engages later-
al prefrontal cortex, including DLPFC and ventrolateral
prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) often in the right hemisphere
[64,87–91]. These regions resemble areas involved in stop-
ping motor actions, suggesting that suppression engages
general response override mechanisms to stop retrieval (a
point to which we will return). Critically, suppression is
accompanied by reduced activity in brain areas linked to
episodic recollection [64,87–91]. For example, suppression
is associated with reduced hippocampal activity, some-
times along with other subregions of the MTL. Given that
single-unit electrophysiology and functional neuroimaging
have linked hippocampal activity to the presence of re-
trieved memories in awareness, these findings suggest
that inhibitory control interrupts hippocampal retrieval
processes to suppress mnemonic awareness. Consistent
with this hypothesis, frontohippocampal interactions dur-
ing suppression have been observed with a range of mate-
rials, including words [87–91], visual objects [67], and
negatively valenced scenes [64], suggesting a domain gen-
eral suppression process.
Although the foregoing pattern suggests that suppres-
sion engages the prefrontal cortex to reduce hippocampal
activity, reduced activity during no-think trials (relative to
think trials) might simply reflect hippocampal engagement
during think trials. Thus, rather than showing that sup-
pression terminates retrieval, less hippocampal activity
Feature Review Trends in Cognitive Sciences June 2014, Vol. 18, No. 6may reflect a passive failure to engage retrieval during no-
think trials. However, evidence has grown that inhibitory
control reduces hippocampal activation. First, hippocam-
pal activity is also reduced compared with activity during a
fixation baseline condition [64,91], suggesting that reduc-
tions reflect more than an absence of positive activation.
Second, DLPFC activation during no-think trials is often
negatively correlated with hippocampal activity [63,64].
Indeed, the magnitude of downregulation and the correla-
tion with DLPFC has in some studies increased over blocks
of the TNT phase [64], suggesting progressively improved
hippocampal regulation with practice. Third, reduced hip-
pocampal activity predicts later forgetting of unwanted
memories [64,91]. Finally, effective connectivity analyses
show a top-down modulatory influence of DLPFC on the
hippocampus [67,88], with negative coupling from DLPFC
predicting the amount of suppression-induced forgetting
[88]. Although the pathways implementing this top-down
influence are unknown, some data suggest the cingulumBox 3. Clinical variation in motivated forgetting
Individual differences in memory control may cause either deficient or
exaggerated rates of forgetting of life events [55,106,107] that we
might better understand and remediate with a neurobiological model
of memory control.
Deficient memory control
Intrusive memories and thoughts arise in many clinical conditions,
such as post-traumatic stress disorder (intrusions), depression
(rumination), attention deficit disorder (distracting thoughts), obses-
sive/compulsive disorder (obsessive thoughts), addiction (craving
related thoughts), and anxiety (worries). This symptom may originate
from deficient inhibitory control over memory. Supporting this,
during retrieval suppression, adults with attention deficit disorder
show impaired suppression-induced forgetting, and also diminished
modulation of hippocampal activity by DLPFC [63]. Similarly, patients
with post-traumatic stress disorder show impaired response inhibi-
tion [108], diminished engagement of lateral prefrontal cortex on
response inhibition tasks [109], and, critically, reduced directed
forgetting [110]. Rumination, depression, and anxiety have also been
linked to impaired suppression-induced forgetting [79,111,112].
Deficient memory control may reflect compromised function of the
networks discussed in this article. For example, disordered control
may originate from diminished cortical volume or white matter
connectivity between prefrontal cortex and sites of modulation.
Deficits in neurotransmitters relating to inhibitory control, such as
dopamine, might also underpin disordered control, a possibility
supported by work linking genetic variation in dopamine metabolism
to memory inhibition [113]. Alternatively, poor memory control may
sometimes reflect lack of experience with intrusive memories and,
thus, inadequate development of the control process, which may
exhibit experience dependent plasticity. For example, after a trauma,
cortical thickness in right DLPFC increases significantly over a year,
with the size of the increase predicting reduced post-traumatic stress
disorder symptoms [114]. Taken together, these findings suggest that
both pharmacological and training interventions could be designed to
bolster memory control.
Exaggerated memory control
One striking example of motivated forgetting is psychogenic amnesia,
in which a person exhibits profound amnesia for large chunks of their
personal experiences in the aftermath of an intensely stressful period
[115]. Two studies suggest that such cases in part reflect exceptionally
effective memory control. One study examined two psychogenic
amnesia patients, with amnesia extending years before scanning
[116]. Both patients were scanned as they identified faces. Some faces
were of strangers (novel faces). Others were of people the patients
knew, with half drawn from people they met before their window ofbundle is a plausible candidate for a white matter tract
that could support the frontohippocampal interactions
underlying suppression [90]. Together, these findings
strongly support a role of DLPFC in reducing hippocampal
activity, interrupting recollection, and impairing reten-
tion. More broadly, they specify a neurobiological model
of memory control that provides a framework for under-
standing disordered control over memory (Box 3).
Opposing neural mechanisms underlie direct suppres-
sion and thought substitution. Although hippocampal
downregulation is a fundamental tool of retrieval suppres-
sion, other mechanisms of controlling awareness are pos-
sible. For example, people may redirect attention to other
thoughts about a reminder. Such diversionary thoughts
could either prevent the entrance of the memory into
awareness, or replace an intruding memory. Behavioural
findings indicate that asking participants to generate
thought substitutes for reminders can be effective inamnesia (identifiable faces), and the other half from during the
window of time affected by amnesia (unidentifiable faces). Unsurpris-
ingly, patients did not recognise the novel faces, and could recognise all
of the identifiable faces. Intriguingly, although neither patient remem-
bered any of the unidentifiable faces, these faces elicited increased
activation in right DLPFC and VLPFC, together with reduced activity in
the hippocampus, as observed in laboratory studies of retrieval
suppression (Figure I). After treatment, one patient recovered their
memories and, upon rescanning, no longer exhibited the suppression
pattern. These findings suggest that extreme psychological distress
leads retrieval suppression to be engaged involuntarily in reaction to
certain stimuli [116]. In an independent study, a patient with
psychogenic amnesia was shown to exhibit dramatically magnified
suppression-induced forgetting in the TNT procedure [117], suggesting
a link between their condition and suppression ability.
(A) (B)
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(ii) (ii)
(i) (i)
Figure I. Brain-imaging data from two patients with dissociative amnesia [116].
Patients 1 (A) and 2 (B) viewed images of faces and decided whether they
recognised them from their life. Images were either strangers (novel), faces they
knew, from outside the window of amnesia (identifiable faces) or faces they
knew from within the amnesic window (unidentifiable faces). (Ai) and (Bi) depict
brain areas that are more active for unidentifiable faces than for identifiable faces
(right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex). (Aii) and (Bii) depict brain areas that are less
active for unidentifiable faces (hippocampus).
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[59,72,73,81,86,88]. Clearly, however, thought substitu-
tion could not involve suppressing retrieval. Given that
the substitutes themselves need to be recollected, this
approach seems to require the opposite outcome sought
with retrieval suppression: the upregulation of retrieval
processes.
Recently, the neural mechanisms of thought substitu-
tion and inhibition in the TNT procedure have been stud-
ied [88] (Figure 2). A thought substitution group was asked
to avoid unwanted memories whenever they encountered
reminders to them by recalling a thought substitute to
distract themselves. However, the direct suppression
group was urged not to generate distracting thoughts,
but to instead ‘push’ the memory from awareness, if it
intruded. Interestingly, although both groups showed sim-
ilar forgetting, only direct suppression reduced hippocam-
pal activation. Critically, these strategies engaged distinct
networks. Whereas direct suppression recruited the right
DLPFC region typically associated with retrieval suppres-
sion, thought substitution engaged the left inferior frontal
gyrus (IFG) associated with selective retrieval [92]. Effec-
tive connectivity analyses revealed that the right DLPFC
was negatively coupled with the hippocampus during di-
rect suppression, more so for people who forgot suppressed
memories. By contrast, during thought substitution, acti-
vation in left caudal IFG predicted greater hippocampal
activation during no-think trials, suggesting that it en-
gaged hippocampal retrieval processes to sustain the sub-
stitute memory. Thus, two approaches to limiting
awareness (suppression and self-distraction) recruited dis-
tinct frontohippocampal networks with opposing effects on
hippocampal processing.
Direct suppression and thought substitution have also
been dissociated electrophysiologically [93]. Prior research
has established an ERP component, known as the late
positive component (LPC), which is sensitive to the level
of episodic recollection and contextual retrieval of a test
item [94]. The LPC occurs over parietal scalp sites 400–
800 ms after a recognition memory target appears, and is
greater for older words than new words. If the LPC indexes
recollection, measuring it during no-think trials should
reveal a reduced LPC compared with that observed during
think trials. This prediction has been confirmed repeatedly
with word pairs [93,95–97], picture–word pairs [58] and
even negatively valenced face–scene pairs [65,98]. Inter-
estingly, participants can for the very same items, make
the LPC come and go when instructions are changed from
retrieval to suppression, suggesting highly efficient control
over recollection [97]. Importantly, direct suppression, but
not thought substitution, modulates the LPC [93]. Given
that thought substitution involves recollecting substitutes
(which itself would generate a LPC), the TNT conditions
should be (and are) electrophysiologically similar. These
findings support the view that direct suppression overrides
conscious recollection, and parallel selective reductions of
hippocampal activity during direct suppression [88].
Suppression mechanisms respond to memory intrusions.
Intrusions of unwanted memories into awareness appear to
have an important role in triggering inhibitory control over286memory. For example, reduced hippocampal activity was
closely tied to the exclusion of intrusive memories from
awareness in a recent study using phenomenological
reports [91]. To link intrusions to hippocampal regulation,
no-think trials on which an unwanted memory entered
participants’ awareness were isolated, and the intrusions
were then linked to changes in hippocampal activity. Par-
ticipants classified their experience after each trial accord-
ing to whether the cue triggered retrieval of its associated
memory. Intrusions elicited strong modulations of hippo-
campal activity (Figure 2). Although hippocampal down-
regulation occurred overall during no-think trials, the
depth of reduction was pronounced during intrusions, when
awareness of the memory needed to be suppressed. Strik-
ingly, the depth of the down-regulation during intrusions
strongly predicted suppression-induced forgetting. Howev-
er, no correlation between downregulation and forgetting
arose during nonintrusions, suggesting that reactivation of
a memory trace is an important condition for memory
disruption [10,99,100]. These findings link the purging of
unwanted mnemonic awareness to reduced hippocampal
activity. Importantly, they also show that intrusions of
unwanted memories decline with repeated suppression,
highlighting the outcome people seek when suppressing
unwelcome remindings.
Intrusive memories seem to leap to mind automatically
given reminders. The need to inhibit such automatic retrie-
vals may engage mechanisms that are similar to those
used to override reflexive actions [9,53,54]. fMRI, beha-
vioural, and EEG evidence supports this possibility. For
example, both retrieval suppression and motor inhibition
engage right DLPFC and VLPFC [63,67,87–91], consistent
with the similar functional demands posed by the two
forms of stopping. Indeed, activation in right lateral pre-
frontal cortex during retrieval suppression predicts not
only later retrieval suppression effects, but also stop signal
reaction time on motor tasks [63]. Moreover, participants’
stop signal reaction time predicts the proportion of aver-
sive pictures forgotten after retrieval suppression [63].
Electrophysiological components, such as the N2, are larg-
er during suppression than during retrieval [65,85,93,95–
98], echoing findings in motor inhibition research, such as
the no-go N2 and the stop signal N2. Importantly, larger
N2s for no-think items compared to think items are even
more pronounced for no-think items that are later forgot-
ten [96]. Strikingly, in one study, the enhanced N2 for no-
think trials predicted N2 enhancement during stop-signal
trials, even when the tasks were separated by a year [96].
Prior work suggests that the source of the motor no-go N2
is either the anterior cingulate cortex or the lateral pre-
frontal cortex [101], consistent with areas involved in
retrieval suppression. Intriguingly, biomarkers of execu-
tive function know to predict individual differences in
motor response inhibition, such as heart rate variability,
also predict the magnitude of suppression-induced for-
getting [83]. Taken together, these findings suggest that
the inhibitory process engaged during retrieval suppres-
sion recruits general response inhibition mechanisms, al-
though more precise comparison of these mechanisms is
needed. For example, although memory and motor inhibi-
tion both often engage right DLPFC and VLPFC,
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Figure 2. Conditions that trigger inhibitory modulation of the hippocampus during retrieval suppression. (A) Direct suppression and thought substitution involve distinct
networks that both cause forgetting, but that have differing effects on the hippocampus [88]. Direct suppression involves suppressing episodic retrieval to prevent or
override recollection of an unwanted memory (depicted by angled lines), whereas thought substitution involves engaging retrieval to recall a substitute thought in response
to a reminder. Direct suppression (upper row) engages right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC), with the former reducing
hippocampal activity (established by effective connectivity analyses). By contrast, thought substitution (lower row) engages a left dominant VLPFC region that does not
reduce hippocampal activity (and in fact, predicts increased hippocampal activity [88]). (B) Measuring intrusions on no-think trials using a trial-by-trial intrusion scale (left,
upper portion; ratings of 2 or 3 indicate an intrusion of the to-be-suppressed memory) reveals intrusions that decline with repeated suppressions (left lower) [91]. Strikingly,
although suppression reduces hippocampal activity overall (right panel, top left subpanel; green bar, think; red bar, no-think), this modulation is driven strongly by trials on
which intrusions occur (right panel, top right subpanel, red bar, intrusions; orange bar, non-intrusions). Hippocampal downregulation (pre-trial - no-think activation,
z-normalized) predicts later memory deficits (baseline - no-think, z-normalized) during intrusions, but not during nonintrusions (right panel, bottom). Abbreviation: fMRI,
functional MRI.
Feature Review Trends in Cognitive Sciences June 2014, Vol. 18, No. 6the former has been emphasised more in research on
memory inhibition (e.g., [64,87,88]), and the latter, by
research on motor inhibition [52]. More work is needed
to understand the roles of these two regions in these
forms of stopping, and if a supramodal inhibition process
exists.Inhibitory control also modulates regions outside the
hippocampus in a content-specific manner. Although
inhibitory control downregulates hippocampal activity
during retrieval suppression, it also modulates activity
in other brain areas, depending on the content being
suppressed. For example, when people suppress retrieval287
Feature Review Trends in Cognitive Sciences June 2014, Vol. 18, No. 6of visual objects, downregulation is also observed in fusi-
form regions known to be critical for perceptual awareness
of objects (Figure 3Bii) [67]. Interestingly, on later percep-
tual identification tests, participants find it more difficult
to see previously suppressed objects in visual noise, com-
pared with either baseline or think objects (Figure 3Ci),
showing that motivated forgetting also impairs implicit(A)
(B)
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288memory [66,67]. Echoing this impaired perception, neural
aftereffects are observed in the same fusiform cortex
regions downregulated during retrieval suppression: no-
think objects show reduced neural priming (Figure 3Cii).
Given that neural priming is considered a signature of
perceptual memory [102], this finding suggests that per-
ceptual memory traces were disrupted by inhibitory(iii)
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emories, via neocortical inhibition [67]. (A) Adaptation of the think/no-think (TNT)
eved (think) or suppressed (no-think) objects, using direct suppression [88,93]. On the
 participants indicated when they could identify the distorted object. (B) Suppressing
ty in fusiform gyrus (ii) (effective connectivity analyses established that the former
s. All objects showed repetition priming (speeded identification time), relative to novel
ed neural priming (reduced neural activity) in fusiform gyrus and the lateral occipital
 Negative coupling between DLPFC and fusiform gyrus predicted the magnitude of the
M, Dynamic Causal Modelling; MGF, middle frontal gyrus; ROI, region of interest.
Feature Review Trends in Cognitive Sciences June 2014, Vol. 18, No. 6control. Importantly, reductions in neural priming were
well predicted by inhibitory control during the earlier TNT
phase: effective connectivity analyses showed that sup-
pressing retrieval led to negative coupling between right
DLPFC and fusiform gyrus, the magnitude of which pre-
dicted the reduced neural priming in fusiform cortex on the
later perception test. Thus, suppressing awareness of vi-
sual memories reduced activity not only in the hippocam-
pus, but also in visual cortex, limiting momentary visual
consciousness of the objects and disrupting later perceptu-
al memory. This finding complements fMRI and beha-
vioural evidence for mechanisms that purge unwanted
contents from visual working memory, illustrating their
inhibitory aftereffects on visual neocortex [12,103].
In the foregoing study, inhibitory control may target
visual object regions to reduce reactivation arising from
intrusive memories, reactivation that may arise through
recurrent connections from the hippocampus [67]. This
possibility suggests a broad principle of memory control:
when reminders evoke activity in content-specific areas,
those areas will be targeted by control [67], affecting content
in those regions. Suppressing emotional memories may
provide a second example. When a memory elicits a strong
emotional response, regions involved in affect may be sup-
pressed. Consistent with this, suppressing aversive scenes
(e.g., violence and death) reduces activity in both the hippo-
campus and the amygdala ([63,64] although see [89]).
Reducing activity in the amygdala could disrupt emotional
learning associated with the event, much like hippocampalBox 4. Motives for motivated forgetting
Below is a sampling of motives that may trigger motivated forgetting,
illustrating the breadth of contexts in which these neural mechanisms
are likely to operate.
Regulating negative affect
Memories that evoke fear, anger, sadness, guilt, shame, anxiety, and
embarrassment trigger people to regulate their emotions by suppres-
sing offending memories [118]. In the short term, emotion regulation
helps to reduce negative feelings, returning to a state of homeostasis
[119]. In the long term, this may contribute to the reliably reduced
frequency of negative autobiographical memories compared with
positive ones for most people [120,121]. It may also contribute to the
fading affect bias, wherein affect associated with negative memories
fades more rapidly than other affective content [120,122].
Justifying inappropriate behaviour
People sometimes engage in dishonest acts that conflict with their
desire to be moral. This dissonance creates discomfort that people
may reduce via motivated forgetting. In experimental settings, people
show increased forgetting of moral rules after behaving dishonestly
(e.g., cheating) even though they are equally likely to remember
morally irrelevant rules as participants who do not cheat [123,124].
Maintaining beliefs and attitudes
People’s beliefs are often resistant to contradictory evidence. This
resilience may be supported by selectively forgetting information not
congenial to one’s beliefs. For example, republicans and democrats
show enhanced directed forgetting for attitude statements that are
incongruent with their beliefs, compared with congruent statements
[125]. Moreover, one’s memory can be shaped by selectively
recounting elements of an event [126–128], a form of thought
substitution [88,129]. Intriguingly, this can undermine listeners’
memories of the omitted facts, a phenomenon called ‘socially shared
retrieval-induced forgetting’ [126–128].or fusiform modulation disrupts episodic memory or object
priming, respectively. Such modulation may contribute to
the widely observed fading affect bias in autobiographical
memory (Box 4). However, because it remains unknown
whether DLPFC is effectively connected with the amygdala
during suppression, reduced activity may instead be a pas-
sive side effect of downregulating recollective activity in the
hippocampus, and the resulting exclusion of the unpleasant
memory from awareness. However, even given this possi-
bility, reduced amygdala activity may reflect success at
achieving a central goal of motivated forgetting in many
real-life circumstances: reduced negative affect arising from
the successful voluntary control of mnemonic awareness.
However, the paradigms discussed here differ from real-
life circumstances in important ways. No directed for-
getting or retrieval suppression paradigm, for example,
captures the natural motivations that people have for
suppressing awareness of memories that they find person-
ally unwelcome (Box 4). Although the neural mechanisms
identified here likely implement motivated forgetting ‘in
the wild’, this work may underestimate the impact on
retention for someone with a true sustained motive. Un-
derstanding the effects of personal motivation will likely
entail a step away from controlled materials, towards
autobiographical experiences unique to an individual.
However, for now, the fundamental control processes that
limit mnemonic processing are emerging, and will inform
our view of how people wilfully shape retention of their
personal experiences.Deceiving others and oneself
Memory inhibition may contribute to creating a state of false belief,
necessary to deceive others and even oneself [130]. Consistent with
this, people can use retrieval suppression to disguise guilty knowl-
edge of a crime when confronting reminders to the crime event,
effectively eliminating EEG markers of recollection [131].
Preserving self image
People protect their self-image by selectively remembering feedback
consistent with positive traits and forgetting that which threatens
their sense of self. This robust ‘mnemic neglect’ effect arises despite
holding encoding time constant, and is only present for encoding
traits in relation to oneself, not others. Mnemic neglect is markedly
attenuated, if, before encoding, people receive positive, self-enhan-
cing feedback on a separate task, reducing their urge for self-
protection [132–134].
Forgiving others
Interpersonal relations are sometimes accompanied by the need to
forgive relationship partners for offenses that provoke anger.
Individual differences in forgiveness are well predicted by inhibitory
control ability [135], and it has been argued that memory inhibition
may be key in overcoming rumination about transgressions [136].
Forgiving and forgetting may indeed be closely related.
Maintaining attachment
The need to maintain an attachment relationship with a parent,
guardian, or powerful authority figure (e.g., a boss) may be essential
to survive or thrive in an environment. Behaviours that promote good
relations or attachment to the influential individual may motivate
selective remembering of experiences compatible with attachment
[129], and forgetting of those that are incompatible. Betrayal trauma
theory, for example, posits that motivated forgetting of childhood
abuse by a trusted caretaker is driven by this attachment need [137,138].
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In this article, we reviewed evidence for the active role that
people have in shaping retention. We focussed in particular
on the function of inhibitory control processes in modulat-
ing the efficacy of memory processes at both encoding and
retrieval. If, upon encoding an experience, people inten-
tionally exclude the event from awareness, retention of the
experience is impaired, compared with cases in which they
intend to remember the event. Although this deficit arises
from several sources, one factor is the termination of
encoding by inhibition, and the disruption of episodic
traces formed up until that point. Similarly, upon encoun-
tering reminders to existing memories, people can engage
inhibitory control to stop retrieval. In both encoding and
retrieval suppression, multiple sources of evidence indi-
cate that control mechanisms mediated by the prefrontal
cortex interrupt mnemonic function and impair memory.
Thus, excluding unwanted memories from awareness does
not merely deprive experiences of further rehearsal, it
contributes to forgetting by disrupting the suppressed
memory. However, much remains to be understood about
the pathways and neural mechanisms of this suppression
(Box 5).
Understanding forgetting is one of the fundamental
goals of the science of memory. We have argued that the
focus on incidental forgetting mechanisms over the past
century, although profitable, has profoundly neglected one
of the most systemic forces shaping retention of life events:
ourselves. Forgetting does indeed happen due to forces
beyond our control; but we are, without a doubt, conspira-
tors in our own forgetting. We wield control over mnemonic
processes, choosing, among life’s experiences, winners and
losers for the potent effects of attention, reflection, and
suppression. Modern behavioural and neurobiological
research is revealing how our momentary choices to stop
encoding or retrieval unfold in the brain, and how control
processes disrupt the normal functioning of memory. These
momentary choices are, in turn, driven by our affective,
motivational, social, and cognitive goals. Thus, to under-
stand why human beings remember what they do of their
life histories, a scientific theory of forgetting must account
for the foundational control mechanisms that implement
the ongoing and active role that we play in shaping the fate
of experience in memory.Box 5. Outstanding questions
 How do motivation and emotion influence the ability to inhibit
memories?
 What are the critical pathways by which DLPFC modulates neural
activity in the hippocampus or neocortex to suppress memories?
 Is there plasticity in the networks underlying memory control that
might be exploited to train people’s management of intrusive
memories?
 What neural changes underlie the disrupted memory performance
associated with memory inhibition and is it related to reconsoli-
dation?
 Are the inhibitory control mechanisms that support the stopping
of encoding and retrieval the same?
 How is activity in the prefrontal–hippocampal memory control
network orchestrated by means of brain oscillations?
 Do cases of psychogenic amnesia arise from motivated forgetting
mechanisms discussed here, or is psychogenic amnesia qualita-
tively different?
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